by Micaela Maquieira
The Paris Agreement signed in 2015 offers all of us great hope that all states will make a genuine and joint commitment to combat global warming. Limiting global warming to well below 2.0°C in this century (desirable, less than 1.5°C) seems to be a very promising target. Almost seven years have passed since that, and we must admit that it is too early to celebrate. In fact, this year’s edition of the Emissions Gap Report of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) calls itself as a testimony to inaction on the global climate crisis.[1] In the Glasgow Climate Pact, member states recognized that fulfilling the Paris agreement requires reducing global carbon dioxide emissions by 45 percent by 2030 relative to the 2010 level and to net zero around mid-century. Even if the last nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are fully implemented, they will only reduce global emissions by 5 to 10 percent by 2030.[2]
We might think we are making progress if we examined the agreements, conferences, regulations, and even internal laws developed by states over the past few years. As a matter of fact, this is not the case; the reality is not going hand in hand with the laws.
It is true that many things happened since the agreement, including a pandemic with a strong negative impact on the economy; Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the consequent global energy market disruption. These could be understandable reasons for the European citizens to support the decision to postpone certain commitments so as to meet the immediate need for energy and achieve independence from Russia. The EU, however, reaffirms and extends its commitment instead.
The European leaders must consider several interests simultaneously. The necessity of ending the EU's dependence on Russian fossil fuels, ensuring the energy provision for the industry and the European citizens, reducing the pressure on prices, and fulfilling the assumed commitments against global warming. Considering this, the REPowerEU Plan appears to be very promising, aiming to reduce energy consumption, diversify the source of energy, and accelerate the development of renewable energy to replace fossil fuels in homes, factories, and power plants.[3] However, the policy of the EU and its members over the past month indicates a different direction.
A number of European nations have chosen liquid natural gas (LNG) as a means of securing their energy supply immediately and being independent from Russia, with the United States serving as their primary ally and largest supplier. Is this policy compatible with the binding Paris Agreement or with the "binding objective of climate neutrality in the Union by 2050" specified in the European Climate Law? Or even with the recent REPowerEU Plan?
As a result of the limited import capacity for LNG in the European Union, the regasification process is restricted. As an example, Enagas in Spain -the country with the most gasification terminals in the EU- has announced that their terminals are not capable of accumulating additional LNG [4]. Consequently, several regasification terminals are currently being constructed in seven EU member states. According to estimates, the capacity of LNG imports in the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) will increase by 34% by 2024, as compared to 2021[5].
Meanwhile, the number of suppliers is also limited. In a recent article published on EURACTIV, Cheniere, the largest LNG exporter in the United States, provided some useful information. Specifically, they indicate that in 2022, the US has provided Europe with just under 40 billion cubic meters of gas which is "almost half" of the 80 billion cubic meters (“bcm”) expected from Russia. Additionally, it is close to the 50 bcm/year of US LNG that the European Union is expecting until at least 2030. In June the company already announced the building of a facility to expand its export capacity by an additional 10 million tonnes per year. But still not enough to the replacement of Russian gas. Actually, they warn that “[w]hen you look at the next 12 to 24 months, realistically, there is no new liquefaction capacity that is able to come online, […] [a]nd that’s worldwide”. In order to replace Russia's gas, it is necessary to construct a number of important facilities, which will require a considerable amount of time and investment. It is only possible with the right contractual support that justifies the construction of these very large, expensive facilities.[6] To achieve this, long-term contracts of supply between the European Union and the United States are required, as well as the commitment to invest in new regasification terminals.
That brings us to the crux of the matter: the impact of the European Union's bet on LNG on the environment. A key part of the EU’s solution calls for increased imports from the United States of LNG, totaling an extra 15 billion cubic meters in 2022 and 50 billion more annually until at least 2030. A Food & Water Action Europe analysis finds that this misguidedEU policy could generate 400 million metric tons of carbon dioxide (CO2). LNG is composed primarily of methane, the second leading contributor to climate change after CO2. Methane’s global warming potential is over 85 times that of CO2 over a 20-year period.[7]
However, the most important point is that “[i]nfrastructure buildouts now will keep us trapped for decades [8].” Taking a closer look at the import facilities that are currently under construction in Europe and considering the large investments that are being made by the EU and the states, we will realize that natural gas was erroneously marketed as a stopgap solution. It is estimated that regasification terminals will last at least 40 years, which means that if a terminal were to go into operation today, it would remain operational until 2062. And because land-locked countries cannot directly receive LNG, the fossil gas industry is pushing buildouts of pipeline infrastructure to transport LNG inland, locking in even more fossil fuel infrastructure. This is in stark contrast with an announced decrease of 60 percent of EU final gas demand by 2030, as modeling under the REPowerEU plan forecasts.[9] The import facility also required a significant amount of capital. In fact, Cheniere's aforementioned plant will cost about $8 billion to build. Thus, they are requiring the countries to sign long-term contracts for between 10 and 20 years.
Nevertheless, I do not wish to imply that the European betting on LGN is a mistake. Nothing could be further from my intention. It may be necessary at the moment to use his undesirable energy. Our politicians, engineers, and economists know the reason for the policy they implemented. It is necessary, however, to refrain from making "binding" commitments that we cannot guarantee that we will be able to fulfill. At the very least, consider possibilities, as well as its consequences. As a matter of fact, these commitments are laudable and they enjoy the support of the public, thus they are widely published. However, they are not being achieved at the moment, which only results in a loss of credibility and demotivation within society, whose efforts were also required and encouraged, for example, reducing energy consumption or investing in more effective goods.
There is no problem with our commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as high as possible, it is the binding nature that makes this commitment bound to fail. Due to this, even if the policy is absolutely valid and reasonable, it could be considered contrary to these binding requirements. The result is a lack of transparency since we are not honest about the situation and are still trying to achieve those incredible but unattainable goals. In spite of the fact that we are still viewing LNG as a short-term measure to improve our energy independence from Russia, we know that we will be compromised for at least half a century, which will prevent us from complying with the commitments. Recognition of the current situation is the first step, followed by the adaptation of the goals to the constantly changing circumstances.
[1] 27 OCTOBER 2022 REPORT. Informe sobre la Brecha de Emisiones 2022. Authors: PNUMA
[2] 27 OCTOBER 2022 REPORT. Informe sobre la Brecha de Emisiones 2022. Authors: PNUMA
[3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131
[4] https://www.eleconomista.es/energia/noticias/11995185/10/22/Toneladas-de-gas-natural-licuado-a-la-deriva-en-el-Mediterraneo-Espana-no-da-abasto-para-recibir-mas.html
[5] https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=54780
[6] https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/top-us-gas-exporter-eyes-europe-growth-with-the-right-contracts/
[7] Nature. [Editorial]. “Control methane to slow global warming — fast.” Nature. Vol. 596. August 26, 2021 at 1; United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. “The challenge.” Available at https://unece.org/challenge. Accessed September 2022 and on file with Food & Water Action Europe (FWAE).- Cited from: “LNG: The U.S. and EU’s Deal forDisaster” https://www.foodandwatereurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/FSW_2210_LNG_EU.pdf
[8] https://www.foodandwatereurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/FSW_2210_LNG_EU.pdf
[9] https://www.foodandwatereurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/FSW_2210_LNG_EU.pdf
